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INTRODUCTION 
Since the late 1970s, the UK has been at the forefront of regulatory innovation in 
electronic communications. In 2003, in a move designed to respond to changing 
technologies, services and markets, it took the unprecedented step of creating a single 
convergence regulator for communications, the Office of Communications (Ofcom). This 
landmark in regulatory design in Europe was not, however, all-encompassing. One 
notable exception was the maintenance of separate regulatory treatment of premium rate 
telephone number services (PRS). The regulatory history of PRS in the UK has since 
proved controversial, not least in respect of their use in television phone-in activity of 
various kinds – principally competitions and voting - on the surface a typical 
convergence regulatory matter. A series of high profile abuses of the system has occurred 
resulting, eventually, in fines for TV broadcasters and PRS providers, suspension of TV 
phone-ins on a number of terrestrial channels, and a major review of the state of PRS in 
participation TV. Even the UK Prime Minister at the time, Tony Blair, was moved to 
assert that it was ‘extremely important that broadcasters come together with the relevant 
telecommunication companies and make sure that this service is done in a reliable  and 
trustworthy way’ (cited in Gibson, O. 2007a). 
This paper explores the recent problems of PRS in phone-ins and competitions in 
UK participation TV through a regulatory convergence analytical lens. Its core argument 
is that maintaining the separate treatment of PRS proved something of a regulatory 
‘hostage to fortune’ cases of TV phone-ins. Since 1986, PhonepayPlus (PPP) - until 
October 2007 known as the Independent Committee for the Supervision of Standards of 
the Telephone Information Services - has maintained responsibility for PRS delivered 
across fixed and mobile telephone and, more recently, broadcast and Internet networks. 
PPP is a non-profit making, independent, public body funded by the industry it oversees. 
It functions through regulating a code of practice. At its inception, Ofcom was given the 
responsibility for setting the regulatory conditions to apply to PRS providers done 
through approval or otherwise of the PPP Code. A Memo of Understanding lays out the 
relationship between PPP and Ofcom in which the former is described as the 
‘“enforcement authority”’ for the regulation of PRS.  
This arrangement carried forward an institutional pattern established when 
telecommunications and broadcasting were regulated separately. The paper argues that 
PPP and its regulatees reflect the regulatory values and practices of evolving 
telecommunications much more than broadcasting. Ironically, use of phone-ins is not a 
new phenomenon in television, though it was the extent to which they became an 
increasingly important part of the commercial considerations of UK broadcasters, in a 
liberalised telecommunications services environment, that proved problematic. PPP, by 
definition of its regulatory remit, did not possess the scope to deal adequately with these 
developments. 
In service terms, premium rate number phone-ins on TV present any convergence 
regulator with a challenge. They are more accurately an issue of regulatory ‘conjunction’ 
than convergence, since they involve two touching-in-part, though mostly separate, 
services. Nonetheless, the paper argues that a suitably charged and resourced 
convergence regulator, such as Ofcom, aware of both the changing commercial priorities 
of UK broadcasters, as well as developments in PRS delivery, could have anticipated the 
TV phone-ins problem or, at least, reacted to adverse developments more quickly than 
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transpired. PPP was unable to achieve this because of its regulatory culture and relatively 
narrower focus. The consequences of this, though far from non-rectifiable, have been 
significant. A legitimate revenue stream has been, for the time being at least, lost or 
significantly reduced. Damage to the reputation of the PRS business and, more 
significantly, commercial broadcasters, has occurred due to consumer mistrust. More 
broadly, because of the involvement of the BBC, citizen trust in public service 
broadcasting has been to some extent eroded too. The reputations of Ofcom, generally a 
positive regulatory exemplar, and PPP are now in need of some repair. Finally, a high 
profile, albeit necessary, review of UK PRS regulation has ensued. 
The regulatory lacuna which arose from maintaining the fissured responsibility for 
PRS regulation from the rest of communications goes back further than the point of 
Ofcom’s creation in 2003. Rather, the decision to create PPP as a separate regulator, for 
what are essentially telecommunications services, was key. The time around the creation 
of Ofcom, in Institutionalist parlance, provided a critical juncture at which such a reform 
could have been executed and the situation rectified. However, the decision to keep PRS 
regulation a separate activity cannot be explained by strong institutional independence 
and path dependency in PRS regulation. In fact, the creation of Ofcom involved 
disrupting and subsuming a set of ‘legacy’ regulators much longer established and better 
resourced than PPP.  Rather, the paper argues that a set of at times contradictory and 
incoherent policy assumptions and preferences around the regulation of converging 
electronic network communications lie at the core of  problems with PRS use in 
television.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section explores the 
main features of the regulation of PRS in the UK. It places particular focus on the reasons 
why their regulation remained separate in a UK communications policy environment 
which, at the beginning of the decade, promoted and instigated regulatory convergence. 
Thereafter, the paper moves to consider the reasons behind, and the extent of, the growth 
of PRS in UK television over recent years. It goes on to explain the problems which have 
ensued from this. The penultimate section of the paper details the consequences of these 
problems which resulted in the most high profile communications convergence regulation 
controversy in the UK to date. The final section of the paper draws some conclusions on 
the lessons which can be learned from the case and their implications for the UK 
electronic communications regulatory institutional context. 
 
 
PRS REGULATION IN THE UK 
 
The regulation of PRS in the UK stretches back to 1986, when its recently liberalised 
telecommunications incumbent, BT, introduced the 0898 number prefix for independent 
companies to offer a range of information and entertainment services. PRS essentially 
constitutes the provision of content, something historically not regulated in 
telecommunications, a private-to-private communications system, unlike broadcasting. At 
the time, a debate arose around the governance of PRS, resolved by agreement between 
the then UK telecommunications regulator, Oftel, the UK Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission and BT. The latter was in favour of pure industry self-regulation though 
concerns existed about potential conflicts of interest in the regulatory adjudication 
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process (ICSTIS 2006), not to mention the danger of regulatory capture. Instead, ICSTIS 
was created as an independent, though sector funded, regulator whose legal status is a 
not-for-profit company limited by guarantee. In its early years, most problematic 
regulatory issues arose around adult chat services provided through the PRS system 
(ibid.).  
The UK market for PRS expanded considerably from its modest origins and has recently 
been valued at £1.3 billion per annum (Ofcom 2008). PRS now incorporate information 
or entertainment delivered over fixed and mobile phone, fax, PC (email, Internet, bulletin 
board), and interactive digital TV (PPP Code 2008). The main applications are sports 
alerts, ringtones, directory enquiries, TV voting, competitions, chat and business 
information. The structure of the supply chain has three main components: network 
operators provide the networks carrying PRS services; service providers deal with the 
services carried by networks; and content or information providers provide the content of 
the service. Often the latter two elements are integrated into the service provision 
function. Until 2004, network operators paid PPP (then ICSTIS) its levy contributions, 
though thereafter this burden fell on service providers, whose fees were passed on to PPP 
by the network operators.  
The UK system of PRS regulation is co-regulatory by design. Ofcom is empowered under 
Section 121 of the 2003 Communications Act, through the PRS Condition, to establish a 
system to ensure that providers of PRS comply with regulations in place. Ofcom 
approves a Code of Practice for PRS regulation which is then administered by an 
‘enforcement authority’ – PPP in this case. Ofcom thus holds overall responsibility and 
accountability for PRS regulation in the UK. It takes action where a direction given by 
PPP under its Code is not complied with. It has legally ensconced powers in the 2003 Act 
to deal with a breach of the PRS Condition, action which may include ‘issuing an 
enforcement notification, imposing a financial penalty, or requiring the contravening 
provider to suspend (for an indefinite period) the provision of premium rate services 
provided by it’ (Ofcom 2008: 7). The 2003 Act defines a PRS as consisting of  ‘the 
provision of the contents of communications transmitted by means of an electronic 
communications network; or allowing the user of an electronic communications service 
to make use, by making of a transmission by means of that service, of a facility made 
available to the users of the electronic communications service’ (Section 120, paragraph 
8).  
Ofcom has produced a set of criteria for effective co- and self-regulation, one of whose 
stipulations is that there must be a ‘clear division of responsibility between co-regulatory 
body (sic) and Ofcom’ (Ofcom and ICSTIS 2005: 3). PPP in practice has been 
responsible for operational regulation of the PRS industry, whilst Ofcom exercised 
approval or otherwise of the regulatory framework, budget and Activity Plan of PPP. In 
PPP’s Activity Report produced annually, it is required to demonstrate how it has 
performed against a set of key performance indicators (KPI) laid out in its MoU with 
Ofcom, Ofcom’s co-regulatory criteria and any other indicators defined and agreed by 
the parties (Ofcom and ICTIS 2005: 7). Ofcom and ICSTIS have committed themselves 
to ‘liaise to identify shared interests and concerns and to address these through mutually 
supportive activity’ (ibid: 4).  
PPP’s role stems from its core responsibility to receive and investigate complaints 
related to breaches of its Code. It gives direction to - and can impose fines on where 
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appropriate - parties involved in PRS provision (Ofcom 2008: 3-4). Accordingly, the 
PPP Code is intended to address those who are involved in ‘the content, promotion and 
overall provision of PRS’ (Ofcom 2008: 3), though this definition has tended to focus on 
telecommunications service providers. Importantly, PPP cannot directly regulate 
broadcasters, which in the case of television phone-ins were found to be the key 
influential players. The PPP Code has, however, shown itself to be responsive to 
developments in the PRS sector throughout its history. In 1992, its fifth edition 
introduced a prohibition on services which offered callers prizes contingent upon call 
duration. In 1995, new provisions on betting tipster services were introduced, whilst in 
2005 an emergency amendment was made instructing network operators to withhold 
revenue transfers to their service providers for a 30 day period after service delivery in 
order to combat PRS fraud (ICSTIS 2006: 12). Section 7.6 of the PPP Code of Practice 
makes stipulations about the conduct of competitions using PRS.  
A key requirement placed on Ofcom as a result of the 1996 Broadcasting Act and the 
2003 Communications Act is to advance the interests of the public as citizens and 
consumers (Ofcom 2007 – PCIP). Ofcom is required to draw up a code for TV and radio 
dealing with standards in the core areas of programmes, sponsorship, and fairness and 
privacy, the latest version of which was created in 2005 (Ofcom 2007: 7, PCIP). 
Reference to PRS in broadcasting stretches back to the Independent Broadcasting 
Authority’s Television Programme Guidelines of 1990 (Ayre 2007). Rule 10.9 of the 
Broadcasting Code elaborates on the two circumstances where PRS can be used. They 
must either be derived directly from a particular programme and enhance viewer benefit 
from it or allow interaction with it; and they must form part of the editorial content of the 
programme as in the case of viewer votes and competitions (Ofcom 2007: 8, PCIP). The 
Ofcom code also includes a specific rule on the need to ensure fairness in the running of 
competitions which applies to all UK broadcasters (Ayre 2007). Rule 2.11 of the Ofcom 
code, introduced only as recently as 2005, stipulates that competitions should be 
undertaken clearly, fairly and appropriately. Ofcom has also supplemented this with 
specific advice on conducting competitions in respect of this Rule. Here, inter alia, 
broadcasters are advised: to ensure that they are au fait with PPP stipulations; to be able 
to demonstrate the methodology used in a constructing a competition; to make clear and 
regular announcement of the rules of competitions; and, saliently, to make clear to 
viewers when a repeat programme is being aired to ensure that they do not attempt to 
participate in a competition or vote which has already concluded (Ayre 2007: 28-29). 
Given the sweep of power invested in Ofcom, it may well be asked why an ‘intermediary 
regulator’, such as PPP, was considered necessary. The institutional legacy of the 
regulation of telecommunications in the UK is likely to provide the answer. Here, the 
Office of Telecommunications, Oftel, was responsible for telecommunications 
infrastructure and service regulation. However, the regulation of content services, 
principally PRS and broadcast services, remained separate. A possible explanation lies in 
the nature of the PRS, as neither ‘straightforward’ telecommunications nor broadcasting. 
On the one hand, a typical service does involve sending and receipt of content. However, 
on the other, the exchange is of a private-to-private nature: nothing is broadcast which 
might have created the public interest issues which shaped the regulation of broadcasting 
historically in the UK.  
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That the PRS regulatory system should have been so constituted originally is itself a 
matter open to debate. There is little indication that the activities of ICSTIS figured high 
on Oftel’s list of priorities, resulting in the development of considerable institutional 
autonomy on the part of the former and a ‘separatism’ in the regulation of PRS from the 
rest of electronic communication in the UK. In 2001, for example, Oftel claimed its 
desire to encourage ‘self- and co-regulation where possible because it offers a faster and 
more flexible alternative to sector regulation by Oftel’ (Oftel 2001: 4). 
With the creation of Ofcom as the convergence regulator in 2003, the argument for 
having a separate PRS regulator should have proven impossible to sustain. For example, 
the current definition of PRS as offering  - ‘some form of content, product or service that 
is charged to users’ phone bills’ (PPP Code 2008) is at best overlapping with other 
telecommunications services and at worst confusing. However, a number of factors are 
likely to explain the continued separation of PRS regulation from the rest of electronic 
communications in the UK. First, around the time of Ofcom’s creation, not least because 
of the emergence of the Internet, a penchant was growing in Europe and beyond for 
adopting self-regulatory and co-regulatory systems. Since PRS was a rare example of the 
existence of such a system already, it was unlikely to have been disrupted and might even 
have been seen as an exemplar of future communications regulation in appropriate areas. 
Second, a significant part of the development of PRS over the last decade has been 
associated with the emergence and growth of online activity based around the Internet. 
There was uncertainty about how this new growth are would develop. Not only in the 
UK, but across the EU as a whole, significant pains were taken not to impose any 
traditional hierarchical communications regulatory model which might compromise the 
ability of UK firms to take commercial advantage of what was assumed to be a 
burgeoning global market for electronic network commerce (author’s interview). Related 
to this and thirdly, the EU regulatory system for electronic communications was by the 
beginning of this decade an important consideration for national member state 
governments designing policy at the national level. The EU’s Electronic Communications 
Regulatory Framework, agreed in 2002, excluded what were described as Information 
Society - or online content services. The framework also excluded regulation of 
broadcasting content because of national political sensitivities. However, it is interesting 
to note that the EU’s own policy review of convergence in the late 1990s which preceded 
the ECRF’s agreement was driven initially by the motivation to create a convergence 
regulatory framework at EU level encompassing broadcasting. This radical approach was 
eventually pared down to the ECRF compromise, though the UK with a recent history of 
communications policy innovation became convinced of regulatory advantages in 
regulating broadcasting convergently, at the national level at least. Finally, and more 
mundanely, the system as regulated by ICSTIS since the mid 1980s was, on the whole, an 
efficacious performer. Combined with uncertainty over the future development of 
Internet-based information services in commercial terms promoted the desire to ‘leave 
well alone’ was promoted. 
The first recorded mention of PPP in the broadcasting code is in the Independent 
Television Commission’s (ITC) 1993 version where broadcasters are instructed to abide 
by its code as well as the ITC’s (Ayre 2007: 25). It took until 1998 for a specific 
provision – related their potential to be considered as illegal gambling or lotteries -  to be 
included in the ITC’s Programme code on the use of PRS in TV competitions. It is 
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important to note that the Ofcom Broadcasting Code requires broadcasters to observe the 
PPP code ‘so a breach of one is technically a breach of the other’ (Ayre 2007: 7). 
However, this regulatory situation creates a serious risk of double jeopardy since a 
broadcaster and a service provider could be charged by their regulator regarding the same 
matter and be adjudged differently. The PPP code makes some specific reference to the 
promotion of competitions through PRS and stipulates that they should be run fairly. 
Until the recent controversy over PRN use in TV phone-ins, it was assumed that PPP was 
the regulatory body to handle problems that might arise in PRS use in TV, apart from in 
matters that deal with the editorial content of a programme which used PRS (Ayre 2007). 
Ofcom and PPP first began to consider jointly the developing system of PRS in television 
only recently through a consultation on call TV quiz services (PPP 2007). 
The UK’s main Public Service Broadcaster (PSB), the BBC, too has Editorial Guidelines 
which deal in some detail with PRS applications. In particular, it is stipulated that the 
lowest cost pricing policy should be pursued by the Corporation; that a clear editorial 
purpose for the use of PRS should be demonstrable; that integrity of votes is a priority in 
competitive award situations; and that enough time should be available between a vote 
closing and the announcement of the results for all the votes cast ‘to arrive, be processed 
and checked’ (Ayre 2007: 28). 
 
 
THE GROWTH OF PRS USAGE IN TELEVISION IN THE UK  
Premium rate number services usage in broadcasting has occurred since the mid-1980s 
when such services began to be licensed. Audience participation is a much longer 
established and popular element in UK TV, where viewers were traditionally encouraged 
to enter mostly prize draw and quiz competitions. Through the 1990s, with the advent of 
multi-channel TV the incidence of using premium rate phone-ins for these purposes 
increased significantly. An expansion of different kinds of PRS usage also occurred, 
particularly around applications such as viewer voting. Dedicated channels have even 
emerged such as the ITV Play quiz channel, launched in 2006 (Ofcom 2007: 3, PCIP). In 
the case of the latter, an important debate has arisen around the extent to which 
programmes are editorial or advertising in nature, and the regulatory implications of this. 
The popularity of TV phone-in activity is no more clearly underlined by the infamous 
statistic that ‘more people vote to evict contestants from the Big Brother house than in 
general elections’ (Robinson 2007: 2). In 2007, viewers were estimated to have spent 
£139 million on television voting and competitions, representing about 13% of the PRS 
market of £1.1 billion (Tryhorn 2008). 
An increasingly competitive environment, in particular resulting in a reduction in the 
value of traditional revenue streams such as advertising, has contributed to the desire of 
commercial broadcasters to exploit PRS applications.  This stands in contrast to the 
earliest regulatory expectations around them, where the Independent Broadcasting 
Authority stipulated that they should be used only where social or educational value 
could be demonstrated and that any excess profits above cost recovery should be donated 
to charity (Ayre 2007: 25). Ayre (2007: 16) has gone as far as to suggest that ‘almost any 
programme genre that can accommodate a PRS-based competition, vote, poll or comment 
now does’. Whole programmes and channels, devoted to quizzes, adult chat and psychic 
readings mostly, have arisen based on the exploitation of PRS. Services are delivered 
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principally through three mechanisms: standard telephony, telephone text messaging, or 
use of the ‘red button’ on the TV set. It is important to note, however, that PRS revenue, 
whilst significant and until recently growing, represents a relatively modest part of the 
revenue streams of commercial broadcasters, possibly as little as 6% (derived from 
Mediatique and Ofcom data), not least those operating in the cable and satellite markets. 
The BBC does not use PRS to generate extra revenue. PRS is nonetheless prominent in 
the minds of audiences (88% are aware of it) and has been used frequently by a 
considerable number (26% per annum) mostly younger people (Ayre, 2007: 21).  
In the commercial relationships which tend to be struck between broadcasters or 
production companies and service providers, call revenue splits are the order of the day, 
thus maximising the incentive of all parties to secure as much call volume as possible 
(Ayre 2007: 23). At the root of the public policy problems which have emerged from the 
increased use of PRS in television lie a series of technical and organisational deficiencies. 
One particularly notorious practice has been the charging of would-be entrants to 
competitions even though they receive an announcement, on getting through by 
telephone, that the competition/vote in question has finished and their vote will not count 
towards its outcome. This charging-but-non-counting has also occurred in the case of text 
message entrants. Here, it has been argued that the technical system used in both cases is 
functionally incapable of being altered to address this deficiency. Another problem with 
text messaging system is ‘latency’ where due to system capacity constraint, receipt of 
messages is delayed in the system, thereby missing the deadline for entry into the 
competition or vote in question. The issue of the charging mechanism for text messaging 
based entries is also the subject of some controversy. According to Ayre (2007), most 
systems use Mobile Originating billing, where customers are charged as they send their 
entry, as opposed to a system of Mobile Terminating billing where the charge occurs 
after the receipt of a text message from the service provider to the customer 
acknowledging the receipt of the initial text. The MT system has the advantage of 
allowing the customer to be informed of any problem with an entry and thus not charged 
for it. However, from the service operator’s perspective, if the caller does not have 
sufficient telephone credit to receive the premium rate text message then the vote is 
counted even though the caller is unable to be charged.  
These technical problems generated around the increased use of PRS in television 
contributed to a series of public policy concerns which the existing regulatory framework 
in the UK, articulated in the 2003 Communications Act, struggled to cope with. Here, 
regulation of broadcasting standards by Ofcom was dichotomised along the lines of 
editorial matters (dealing with issues such as the right of broadcasters to have freedom of 
expression and the right of audience members not to be exposed to harmful or offensive 
material) and advertising matters which in its dealings with issues of harm and offence is 
concerned with consumer protection (Richards 2007). The rigidity of this 
dichotomisation meant that PRS regulatory issues were difficult to deal with. On the one 
hand, they gave rise to issues of an editorial nature but, on the other, they also reflect 
matters of consumer protection. In practice, Ofcom has considered them in an editorial 
context, though doing this merely highlighted the need to create a new regulatory 
mechanism to cope with the increasing likelihood of dealing at one and the same time 
with issues of the audience member as citizen and consumer in an increasingly 
commercialised broadcasting environment. 
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PROBLEMS WITH PRS IN TELEVISION AND THEIR REGULATORY 
CONSEQUENCES  
Evidence of serious and sustained problems with the system of PRS in UK participation 
TV began to emerge in 2006. By early 2007, a number of commercial terrestrial TV 
broadcasters, notably ITV and Channel 5, had suspended services utilising PRS pending 
internal investigations into their efficacy (Tryhorn 2007). In 2006, allegations were made 
that the PRS provider, Eckoh, had informed Channel 4, to whom it was contracted, in 
early 2005 of unfairness in the contestant selection process for the programme You Say, 
We Pay (Holmwood 2007a). Regarding the Deal or No Deal programme, it was found by 
Ofcom that Channel 4 had become aware of problems with the staggered selection of 
contestants in March 2007 but allowed the process to continue until May by which time it 
had accrued £2.1 million in revenue (Byrne 2007). A report by the auditors Deloitte, 
commissioned by ITV, suggested that on one of the latter’s programmes, Ant and Dec’s 
Saturday Night Takeaway, ‘winners chosen by viewers were discounted in favour of 
other contestants who programme-makers believed were more telegenic or talented’ 
(Robinson 2007: 1). It has been estimated that ITV viewers alone spent £7.8 on calls 
which did not exercise any influence on the outcome on the programmes in question 
(Gibson and Wray 2007). Problems initially seemed to be centred on commercial 
terrestrial TV channels with some degree of public service broadcasting remit (PSB) 
which had been losing revenue since the late 1990s (Grande 2004). However, the BBC 
soon became involved in the controversy as well. In one case, a PRS operator Audiocall, 
a subsidiary of the BBC’s commercial arm BBC Worldwide, was found to have collected 
and retained £106,000 from calls made after lines to a charity phone-in had closed, a sum 
which it subsequently paid to charity with interest (Fenton 2008a). In July 2007, the BBC 
suspended all phone-in and interactive services on TV, radio and the Internet (Gibson, O. 
2007b). It commissioned the auditor PricewaterhouseCoopers to undertake an 
investigation of its behaviour which concluded that between October 2005 and 
September 2007, over 20 separate BBC shows whose aim was to raise money for charity 
performed inappropriately. The BBC also appointed its legal advisers Baker and 
Mackenzie to undertake an investigation, an important conclusion of which was that 
whilst there was no illegality, evidence existed that some BBC Worldwide staff were 
aware of the practice of retaining caller revenue after the close of competitions (Byrne 
2008). In November, the BBC produced a Code of Conduct on Competitions and Voting, 
which it emphasised would not be run to make a profit (except for charitable purposes), 
and where it promised to ‘handle all interactive competitions and votes with rigorous care 
and integrity’. It also emphasised that in the future it would ‘never ask anyone to pose as 
a competition contestant or winner’ (BBC Trust 2007) and capped the cost of calls to 
premium rate phone-ins at 15p except in the case of charity events (Gibson 2008). 
Find source and modify: Here, it was alleged and proven that potential contestants for the 
charades style programme were solicited after a decision had been made on a list of 
potential winners on the show in question (Morris 2007).  
 
Soon after the issue of PRS in television problems reached the public domain Ofcom and 
PPP launched reviews aimed at identifying the precise nature and causes of the problems 
and prescribing rectifying measures. This classic regulatory reactivism included a joint 
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meeting with relevant industry parties. Ofcom also launched a PRS in television enquiry 
in March 2007, led by Richard Ayre.  In May 2007, PPP followed suit. However, the 
power of Ofcom in the regulatory relationship is clear in that the PPP consultation’s 
findings were put on hold until the Ayre enquiry had made its recommendations. The 
Ayre report produced a set of findings which proved the major catalyst for recent 
regulatory and procedural change in PRS TV provision.  
First, a major theme of the report was the potentially confusing division of 
responsibilities between Ofcom and PPP. Here, viewer complaints arising from voting 
conducted through PRS on the Channel 4 programme Big Brother 7, was singled out. A 
large number of viewer complaints received by Ofcom (2000) were passed on to PPP, far 
outnumbering those sent directly to PPP (635), suggesting a relative lack of knowledge of 
the PRS regulator’s existence. PPP then made a judgement on the parties involved, 
namely Channel 4 and two PRS service providers. The former was found to have created 
an editorial change in the content of the programme which caused viewers to feel 
mislead. However, PPP was not in a position, because its remit did not extend to 
broadcasters, to fine Channel 4. Rather, it could impose administrative charges (for 
handling the dispute) and a fine (the latter of which it declined to impose) on the 
telecommunications service providers concerned. In 2007, Ofcom received as many as 60 
separate complaints about voting through PRS on TV, most of which were considered to 
be matters for PPP, that is, related to the efficacy of the voting mechanism (Ayre 2007: 
34). However, matters related to voting are often so deeply bound up with editorial policy 
issues that it seems logical to have these considered by one suitably qualified authority – 
the corollary is that not to do so creates the strong possibility of generating inefficiency 
and inefficacy.  
Second, the Ayre report was particularly critical of the commercial relationships which 
had grown up between broadcasters, programme producers, telecommunications service 
providers and telecommunications network operators. Here, it was found that 
broadcasters were able to exert very considerable and unequal economic power on 
service providers.  Tellingly, the report concluded that ‘there is evidence of intense 
pressure applied by broadcasters upon producers, and by both upon service providers, to 
maximise revenues – and that meant maximising calls’ (Ayre 2007: 6). Despite this, 
broadcasters did not have sufficient grasp of the technical and operational details of the 
value chain around the use of PRS in TV, particularly its potential technical inadequacies. 
Instead, they were found to be ‘in denial about their responsibility to ensure the 
programmes they devise, commission or produce fully deliver on the transactions they 
offer to viewers’ (Ayre 2007: 5). 
Bringing these two themes together, Ayre (2007: 40) concluded that the ‘absence of a 
suitable regulatory regime for broadcasters means that there is no compelling interest for 
broadcasters to give the same priority to principles of consumer protection as they do to 
delivering on general audience expectations’. The increased use of PRS created an 
important financial relationship between broadcasters and consumers - as opposed to 
viewers - which the former neglected. Competitions had historically been used by 
broadcasters as a free to enter means of generating viewer loyalty. The current situation, 
of premium rate charging created a new dynamic - and thus new responsibilities – for 
broadcasters. Concluding his report, Ayre recommended that licences of broadcasters 
should be amended to include specific requirements aimed at consumer protection in 
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respect of PRS and any other direct commercial transactions. The major outcome of this 
change in regulatory terms was that where a breach of a broadcaster’s licence is alleged, 
it would in future fall to Ofcom to investigate (Ayre 2007:11). It was also concluded that 
except in instances where Ofcom’s Broadcasting Code in relation to provisions on 
fairness in competitions apply, it is up to the BBC Trust to decide whether it would make 
the Corporation the primary point of responsibility in the chain, though the inference was 
clear that it should do so.  
In February 2008, Ofcom introduced new regulations on participation TV, in line with 
the recommendations of the Ayre report1, making broadcasters directly responsible for all 
interactions with viewers by telephone, email or post (Tryhorn 2008). As a consequence 
of a variation introduced into their licences, broadcasters are now ‘responsible for all 
arrangements for the management of communication, including telephony, between 
members of the public and the Licensee of the Licensee’s contractors or agents…where 
such communication is published in programmes…the Licensee shall ensure that the 
provisions of the code approved by Ofcom for regulating the provision of premium rate 
services, or in the absence of such a code, the terms of any order made by Ofcom for such 
purposes, are observed in the provision of the Licensed Service’ (Ofcom 2008: 8-9). 
Broadcasters would also now be required by Ofcom to ensure that their systems were 
regularly vetted by an independent third party, the regulator also declaring its intention to 
introduce a 12-18 month programme of spot checks to monitor the evolving situation 
(Gibson 2008). Around the same time, PPP also introduced a new system of prior 
permission for would-be PRS providers to broadcasters2
In the interim between the allegations of impropriety and the aforementioned regulatory 
changes, a spate of high profile investigations of alleged abuses of PRS in UK television 
proceeded apace. By early 2007, Ofcom had launched as many as 23 separate 
investigations concerning alleged PRS in television irregularities, whilst PPP dealt with 
15 cases (Robinson 2007). This resulted in a series of fines from Ofcom for UK terrestrial 
. It also set out a number of 
conditions for operators to meet, not least ensuring the prompt closure of telephone lines 
and random choice of winners (Sweney 2008) though this gave the distinct impression of 
closing the stable door after the horse had bolted. The broadcasters’ new verification 
system will require inter alia ‘confirmation by the third party that an end-to-end analysis 
of the technical and administrative systems to be used for the receipt and processing of 
votes and competition entries from members of the public has been conducted’ as well as 
undertaking reviews of individual programmes to track votes and competition entries 
through all the relevant stages to ensure that probity has been maintained (Ofcom 
2008:13). A potential problem for broadcasters is having the necessary technical 
expertise to deal with the technological aspects of managing PRS. In practice, Ofcom will 
only ask a broadcaster for detailed information on its scheme’s performance if it 
developed a specific cause for concern (Ofcom 2008: 28).  
                                                 
1 The draft licensing variation for broadcasters as well third party audit for broadcasters using PRS in 
programming were proposed in a July 2007 Consultation document (Ofcom 2007).  
2 These referred to procedures for treating  audience responses, management of excess peak PRS traffic, 
line closure, winner selection, systems back up and clear contractual arrangements (PPP 2007: 
www.phonepayplus.org.uk/pdfs_news/Statement_on_Participation_TV.pdf). Importantly, broadcasters 
must also verify that any PRS provider they contract with has received prior permission status from PPP. 
13 
 
broadcasters levied between June 2007 and May 20083. PPP similarly issued fines 
against a number of PRS providers4
The period also witnessed what could amount to a highly significant development of the 
regulatory relationship between Ofcom and PPP. In December 2007, a new framework 
agreement for PRS governance between the two bodies was. Here, a commitment was 
made to create closer coordination of strategies and objectives and better reporting of 
market trends and policy issues. Ofcom now approves all appointments and re-
appointments on the PPP Board as well as its Chief Executive position. Ofcom can now 
intervene to give direction to PPP on matters which it considers to be particularly 
important or where ‘clarity of responsibility needs to be explicit’. Finally, a senior Ofcom 
official, the ‘Ofcom Sponsor’, would in future be responsible for overseeing the inter-
organisational relationship with PPP (Ofcom 2008:4; Ofcom 2007), in effect making 
Ofcom the ‘lead regulator of premium rate phone services’ (Sweney 2007b: 1). This in 
. In one of the most high profile cases, the GMTV  
programme was fined £2 million by Ofcom after it was found that over a period of more 
than four years competition winners were picked before telephone lines had closed. In 
relation to this case, PPP fined the telecommunications service provider used by GMTV, 
Opera Telecom, £250,000 (Sweney 2007a). The PPP Chief Executive, George Kidd, 
commenting on the case contended that ‘the consumer harm caused was aggravated by 
the sheer number of callers who paid to enter the competition but had no chance of 
winning, the huge amount of revenue that was unfairly generated from these callers, the 
length of time over which the practice had been going on and the extensive damage 
caused to public trust in phone-in competitions’ (cited in Brook 2007: 2). In July 2007, 
the BBC was twice fined (by Ofcom) for the first time in its history. The first, £50,000, 
concerned editorial failures arising from a competition run on the Blue Peter programme 
(Gibson, O. 2007d); the second, £400,000 related to unfair conduct in a range of 
competitions conducted across as many as eight TV and radio shows. The BBC expressed 
concern about public money for PSB being taken away as a result of the fines (Fenton 
2008b). Between mid-2007 and mid 2008, broadcasters had been fined a total of 
£11,082,000 by Ofcom (Sweney and Holmwood 2008). At the time of writing, Ofcom 
was in process of conducting three more investigation related respectively to the BBC, 
ITV and Channel 5 (Holmwood 2008). The PRS in television saga has undoubtedly had a 
negative effect on the public’s trust of broadcasters. Problems have also severely dented 
the revenue streams of commercial broadcasters from PRS activity, as much as 20% less 
in the case of ITV for the March-April 2007 period. In March 2007, it was decided that 
ITV Play would be withdrawn. (Ofcom 2007: 52, July consultation). As a result of the 
PRS fines, ITV reported that it expected to accrue a one-off extra charge of £18 million 
in its 2007 accounts (Edgecliff-Johnson 2007). The effect of highly publicised 
irregularities in PRS has had a dramatic effect on service providers also: Eckoh, one of 
the main service providers for ITV claimed a 70% drop in call revenue in early-to-mid 
2007 (Holmwood 2007). 
                                                 
3 Channel Five (June 26, 2007: £300,000 fine for faking winners of phone in quiz on Brainteaser); GMTV 
(26 September 2007: £2million fine for phone competitions entrants had no chance of winning); Channel 4 
(20 December 2007: £1.5 million for misconduct related to the shows Richard and Judy and Deal or No 
Deal); ITV (8 May 2008: £5.675 million for misconduct related to abuse of premium rate phone lines 
related to a range of  shows) 
4 6 July 2007 – Eckoh (£150,000); 9 August 2007 – iTouch (£30,000); fine over GMTV scandal 
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marked contrast to the 2005 Memo of Understanding between Ofcom and PPP which 
declared that the ‘intention is that Ofcom will not involve itself in the operational work of 
ICSTIS or in relation to specific duties unless ICSTIS is failing to comply with 
undertakings, agreed processes or KPIs [key performance indicators] in circumstances 
where that is leading to a material negative impact on the adequacy of regulation’ (Ofcom 
and ICSTIS 2005: 2).  
Ofcom Chief Executive, Ed Richards has referred to the changes as creating ‘a new 
relationship, whereby PPP will become an Agency of Ofcom to whom we can give 
direction, together with the new formal Framework Agreement that will codify the 
necessary changes’ (Richards 2007: 3; confirmed by PPP Press Release, 19.2.08). 
However, he separately argued that the saga was not one of a regulatory vacuum but 
rather a ‘systemic failure of compliance’ (cited in Tryhorn 2007: 1). It was also claimed 
by Lord Currie, Ofcom Chair, that it could not have incovered the problems earlier 
without being ‘incredibly heavy-handed’ (cited in EdgeCliffe-Johnson 2007b: 1). As for 
PPP, its Chairman was recently reported as having argued that the regulatory body should 
focus in the future in anticipating where problems may occur (Parker 2006). In 
responding to Ofcom’s consultation, it had agreed that broadcasters should be directly 
responsible for PRS through a change in their licences. However, PPP was keen to 
position itself prominently in any future regulatory scenario by asserting that licence 
amendment in itself was not a guarantor of compliance and that PPP would be ‘well 
placed to help Ofcom deal with non-compliance by the party recognised as “service 
provider”’ using its Code of Practice (PPP 2007:3-4). In March 2007, PPP issued a 
consultation document making a number of recommendations for change to its Code, the 
most important of which relate to the creation of a smaller Board and the establishment of 
a Code Compliance Panel (Ofcom 2008).  
In a 2008 statement, Ofcom issued a detailed list of guidance to broadcasters on how to 
conduct PRS use. In these an important distinction between the future roles of Ofcom and 
PPP was made. Regarding competitions, complaints alleging broadcast of misleading 
information about PRS charges or line availability would be referred to PPP since ‘they 
are considered to be complaints about promotional material concerning the premium rate 
services itself’. However, ‘complaints concerning potential unfairness surrounding the 
conduct of a competition or its solution and/or methodology’ would ‘normally be 
investigated by Ofcom (Ofcom 2008: 36-37). However, arguably this could create 
conflict – why can’t Ofcom do both?  
The extent to which damage to viewer trust has occurred as a result of the revelations on 
PRS use in TV was clear from efforts made by regulators and regulates to reassure 
viewers. It was reported that PPP was contemplating the introduction of a trustmark 
system (Tryhorn, 2007) that would mean broadcasters paying for a regular independent 
audits (Gibson 2007), an interesting measure drawn from the self-regulatory toolbox.  
PPP also suggested that phone-in TV programmes should provide cost warnings after 
each £10 is spent by consumers, as well as information on viewers’ chances of being put 
through as a contestant in a phone-in competition (Holmwood 2007b). In September 
2007, the Heads of the UK’s four main terrestrial broadcasters, BBC, ITV, Channel 4 and 
Channel 5, met to try to resolve the series of issues in an increasingly high profile affair 
(Robinson 2007). ITV’s involvement in PRS phone-ins was described by its Chairman, 
Michael Grade, as a ‘complete shambles’ (cited in Parker 2007: 1).  
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CONCLUSIONS  
The recent problematic period in the history of PRS use in UK terrestrial TV 
competitions and phone-ins provides an important illustration of risks that can occur 
when regulatory fissures exist in converging - or more accurately interfacing - markets in 
electronic communication. Matters were exacerbated in regulatory terms in that, on the 
surface, a convergence communications regulator had been in place since 2003. 
However, whilst Ofcom was, officially, the ‘backstop’ regulator of PRS, in practice it had 
insufficient engagement with developments in the PRS sector due to operational 
responsibility for PRS lying with PPP. It has been suggested that Ofcom’s apparent lack 
of curiosity over developments in the use of PRS in television may have partly been 
motivated by a desire not to tread on the regulatory ground of PPP (Bell 2007). Similarly, 
PPP had insufficient knowledge of the operational culture and changing priorities of 
broadcasters. 
It is impossible to determine whether the problems generated by recent PRS use in 
broadcasting could have been prevented were Ofcom responsible directly for PRS 
regulation. In theory, a convergence regulator should be alive to areas where market-
based convergence is occurring across its fields. However, PRS use in commercial TV 
was not a new phenomenon; rather it was the changing nature of its use that lay at the 
core of ensuing technical and operational difficulties. The episode also raises the question 
of the degree to which it is a regulator’s job to be anticipatory or reactive. In the case of 
market-based regulation in a liberal economy, the dominant view is that regulation should 
be used as sparingly as possible to rectify problems which arise, such as consumer harm, 
for example. To do otherwise risks stifling technological and market developments. In 
some ways the PRS saga is a matter of rectifying consumer welfare abuses. The Ayre 
Report asserted that this vision of the viewer as a consumer was absent from the 
perspective of the terrestrial commercial broadcasters concerned. However, it could also 
be argued that the PRS abuses in broadcasting are not so easy to disentangle from the 
experience of the viewer as a citizen, with rights bound up in the traditional public 
interest stipulations of broadcasting. As one commentator noted, the abuses were all 
essentially fraudulent even when they’re legal. They all abuse the lingering perception 
among the easily preyed upon that television won’t rip them off because somehow it’s 
different to, say, the Internet or junk mail’ (Gibson, J. 2007:2). Here public interest 
regulation is often proactive as well as reactive and arguably a convergence regulator 
should have anticipated the potential problems of PRS use in the context of an awareness 
of the changing commercial priorities of UK terrestrial broadcasters as their traditional 
revenue streams weakened.  
Regulatory remedies aside, Ofcom has argued that whilst ‘regulators can deal with the 
consequences of failure…the necessary culture of straight-dealing and integrity can only 
be engendered from within organisations themselves’ (Richards 2007: 2). Whilst viewers 
have been given the right to claim back money lost as a consequence of entering 
competitions, they have to provide itemised phone bills. It is also unclear how many will 
go to the trouble of doing so given the ‘salami-like’ nature of the deceptions. In the case 
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of the one Channel 4 show, it has been claimed that the offered refund was claimed by 
fewer than one in 10 viewers (Gibson, O. 2007c). The BBC does not make money out of 
PRS unlike commercial broadcasters: for the former breaches are thus a matter of trust 
undermined; for the latter both viewer trust and consumer welfare are potentially eroded. 
Even if PRS in programming has peaked, in the future broadcasters will look for ways to 
enter into one to one financial transactions with viewers. This required, in the view of 
Ayre, undertaking changes to the current system. 
Despite the changes to the licences of broadcasters to make them directly responsible for 
the conduct of PRS services, concern has been expressed still about a lack of clarity 
existing in the remit of regulators of PRS (Sweney 2007c). The PRS operator, Eckoh,  in 
the light of a record fine levied by PPP in July 2007 commented that it was ‘something of 
a lottery as to which regulator presides over which case or, indeed, whether both 
regulators preside over the same case at different times, and makes regulation 
unpredictable, inconsistent and unfair’ (cited in Sweney 2007d: 2). The regulatory 
remedies provided by Ofcom and PPP are likely to eradicate any future abuses of the 
system along the lines of the subject of this paper. Nonetheless, though Ofcom will 
exercise in the future much closer scrutiny over PPP, the fact that premium rate number 
regulation has not been completely subsumed into the Ofcom departmental structure 
seems an operational anomaly. 
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